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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-----0000000-----
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 
PROPER TY AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Appellant - Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTERN CASUALTY AND 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Respondent - Defendant, 
-----0000000-----
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
-----0000000-----
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15317 
This is an action by the plaintiff - appellant, National 
Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company, against the defendant -
respondent, ·western Casualty and Surety Company, under a theory of 
equitable and conventional subrogation and/or contribution, to recover 
proportionate share of monies paid in settlement of a tort claim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
There being no real dispute as to the facts of this case, 
both )Jc.rties 1nade Motions for Summary Judgment and filed 
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Memorandums of Points and Authorities with respect thereto. Both 
Motions were heard by Judge Dean E. Conder on the 9th day of June, 
1977. Based upon the written and oral arguments, the Court ordered 
that appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied and that 
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Order granting respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying appellant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment set aside and further seeks a Judgment in its favor 
and against the respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All facts are as recited in appellant's Brief except for the 
following: 
It was appellant's understnding that the terms of the settle-
ment were agreeable to all concerned and that for purposes of the 
settlement the liability on the part of the Sheriff's Mounted Posse and 
Brent G. Story, along with that of Afton LeRoy Cheney, was conceded, 
and that the only disagreement was whether the respondent's Home-
owner's policy applied to this incident. Consistent with that understand-
ing, appellant has never asserted any sort of subrogation or contribution 
right directly against Brent G. Story, nor have they named him as a 
defendant in this action. The re has never been any question but that 
the settlement was reasonable. 
- 2-
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ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
LEGAL THEORY NOT RAISED IN LOWER 
COURT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED 
FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Respondent argues for the first time in Point I of its Brief 
filed with this Court that appellant is not entitled to recover any amount 
from respondent under a theory of subrogation or contribution because 
an insurer may not recover from its own insured or co-insured citing 
the Utah case of Board of Education of Jordan School District v. Hales, 
566 P, 2d 1246 (Utah, 1977) as authority. Respondent did not raise that 
particular legal theory in the lower Courts. In fact, the argument has 
its genesis at a time subsequent to the final lower court decision. Both 
parties' Motions for Summary Judgment were heard by the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, Judge, on June 9, 1977. Shortly thereafter he ruled 
in favor of the respondent. The case of Board of Education of Jordan 
School District v. Hales, supra, was handed down by this Court not 
only after the parties had filed their Motions for Surrunary Judgment, 
submitted written Memorandums in support thereof, made oral argu-
ments but after the lower court made its final decision, 
This Court has reiterated on numerous occasions that it 
cannot pass on matters raised for the first time on appeal, For example, 
in thee case of Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 
'' •. cl:;·;"), 401 (1970), Chief Justice Crockett, writing for the majority, 
-3-
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stated: 
The contention relating to strict liability 
is an attempt to inject that doctrine into this 
case for the first time on appeal. It was 
dealt with neither in the plaintiff's complaint, 
nor in the pretrial conference, nor at the 
trial. It is therefore not appropriate to 
address such a contention to this court. Orderly 
procedure, whose proper purpose is the final 
settlen1ent of controversies, requires that a 
party must present his entire case and his 
theory or theories of recovery to the trial 
court; and having done so, he cannot there-
after change to some different theory and thus 
attempt to keep in motion a merry-go- round 
of litigation. [Emphasis added,] 
For similar holdings see: Thompson Ditch Company v. 
Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P. 2d 528 (1973); State of Utah, by and 
through Road Commission v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P, 2d 817 
(1972); and Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P, 2d 702 (1971). 
Regardless of the merit of respondent's position, respon-
dent, having failed to make the argument previously, may not claim 
that appellant is now entitled to recover any amount from respondent 
under a theory of subrogation or contribution because an insurer may 
not recover from its own insured or co-insured. 
POINT II 
COVERAGE OF THE PARTICULAR RISK INVOLVED 
IN THIS CASE IS NOT EXCLUDED BY SPECIFIC 
EXCLUSION 1 (e) OF RESPONDENT'S 
HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY 
h "t . r in '"'' The question of insurance coverage as i s gene~1~ - · 
-4-
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mc~,ning of the phrase "arising out of any premises." Precisely stated, 
t11e issue is whether, for purposes of excluding insurance coverage, 
the injury arose out of a particular premise because a horse bolted off 
the same and ran through an open gate onto the highway where it collided 
with an automobile. 
The specific language of Exclusion 1 (e) of respondent's 
Homeowner's Insurance Policy reads: 
This policy does not apply: 
e. to bodily injury or property damage 
arising out of any premises, other than an 
insured premises, owned, rented or con-
trolled by any Insured; • • • 
This Court, in the case of Bergera v. Ideal National Life 
Ins. Co., 524 P. 2d 599 (Utah, 1974), held that an insurance policy is 
simply a contract between the insured and the insurer and that its 
language should be construed pursuant to the same rules applied to 
other ordinary contracts, and that words used should be given their 
usual and ordinarily accepted meaning. It is also generally recognized 
that exceptions, limitations and exclusions to the insurance agreement 
require a narrow construction in favor of the insured. Furthermore, 
this Court recognized the doctrine of "reasonable expectations" in the 
czcc;c of Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Utah 2d 303, 373 P. 2d 
SF.ri, -,8 J (1962), wherein it stated that: 
••• the plaintiffs are thus entitled to the 
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broadest protection that they could reason-
ably believe the commonly understood 
meaning of its terms afforded them; ••• 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of California m· the case of 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 109 Cal. Rptr. 
811, 514 P. 2d 123, 128 (1973), stated: 
• • • iVhereas coverage clauses are inter-
preted broadly so as to afford the greatest 
possible protection to the insured, ••• 
exclusionary clauses are interpreted nar-
rowly against the insurer. 
See also, King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 84 N. M. 550, 505 
P. 2d 1226 (1973); Upland Mutual Ins., Inc. v. Noel, Kan., 519 P. Zd 
737 (1974); and Fassio v. Montana Physicians' Service, 553 P.2d998 
(Mont., 1976). 
\Ve have been unable to uncover any case law interpreting 
the meaning of "arising out of any premises" as that term of art is 
used in a homeowners insurance policy. However, the words "arising 
out of" used in an automobile liability insurance policy have been inter-
preted to mean "originating from," "having its origin in, 11 "growing out 
of, 11 or "flowing from. " See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsbu_21h 
Pa. v. Brnecks, 179 Neb. 642, 139 N. W. Zd 821, 826 (1966). The word 
"premises" has been defined by lexicographers in The Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language, The Unabridged Edition, 1967, to 
mean "a tract of land including its building, " "a building together with 
its grounds or other appurtenances," or "the property forming the 
-6-
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sub5ect of a conveyance or bequest." See also, Lunceford v. State Na-
t:ional Securities, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 804, 186 S.E.2d320, 321 (1971). 
In other words, to say the accident arose out of any premises means 
the accident had its origin in, grew out of, or flowed from any tract of 
land, its buildings or other appurtenances. 
It is appellant's position that for the injury to "arise out of 
any premises" it must (1) occur on the premises, and (2) be caused by a 
condition, natural or artificial, of said premises. For instance, an acci-
dent arises out of a natural condition of the premises when an individual is 
injured by falling in an open ditch, drowning in a pond or slipping on a 
rock situated thereon. Similarly, an accident would arise out of an 
artificial condition of the premises where an individual is injured while 
sitting on a gate when it collapses, by falling through a trap door, or 
stumbli..'Lg over a tree stump, the gate, trap door and stump all being 
located on the property. In short, the accident must occur on the pro-
perty, and a conditon of the property must be the source or fountainhead 
of the injury, 
Appellant disagrees with respondent's position that "arising 
out of any premises" means "connected with the premises" in the sense 
there must only be some causal connection between the property and the 
accident, Appellant contends that the property must be more than a mere 
contributing factor or a link in the chain leading up to the accident. Just 
a.s it is wrong to conclude that Exclusion 1 (e) of respondent's Homeowner's 
_;_,-,,,,-·;;1,ce Policy would apply to the explosion of a hot air balloon 2,000 
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feet in the air because it "arose out of the prernises" or because •t 
l Was 
"causally connected" with the premises in the sense that but for the hot 
air balloon leaving the ground the accident would not have occurred 
' 
there is a gap in the argument that because the horse ran through the 
open gate located on the property the accident "arose out of the premises, 
As previously indicated, respondent claims that the term of 
art "arising out of" and the term of art "connected with" are treated by 
many cases as being snonymous and, among others, cites the Louisiana 
case of Jackson v. Lajaunie, 253 So. 2d 540 (La. App., 1971) as 
authority. In that case, a service station owner shot a customer with a 
gun he thought was loaded with blanks. The garage owner had a garage 
liability insurance policy with the United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company and a homeowner' s insurance policy with the Continental 
Insurance Company. An exclusion of the homeowner' s insurance policy 
provided that there would be no coverage for "any act or omission in 
connection with the premises which are owned, rented or controlled by 
an insured." The contested issue was whether the shooting was "an 
act or omission in connection with the service station premises. 11 The 
intermediate Louisiana Court held that the accident did not occur "in 
connection with the premises;" that the exclusion did not apply; and 
that the garage owner was covered under his homeowner's policy. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Jackson v. Lajaunie, 264 
La. 181, 270 So. 2d 859 (1973) reversed the Louisiana Court ol Appe;l 
-8-
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n1ling that the accident did occur in connection with the pre:mises and 
that the homeowner's policy excluded coverage. Of significance is the 
Louisiana Supreme Court's analysis of the meaning of the phrase "in 
coD.nection with" wherein it stated that it is a "broader term" than 
"arising out of. 11 
In Duggan v. The Travelers Indemnity Co., 383 F. 2d 871 
(1967), a husband and wife held a $10, 000.00 pre:mises liability policy 
which contained an exclusion for "any act or omission in connection 
with [business] premises. 11 Their dog, left in the wife's beauty parlor 
while the husband went on an errand, bit one of his wife's customers. 
The court held that the premises liability insurance policy covered the 
accident in question and that the exclusion did not apply because the 
i..rijury did not occur 11in connection with 11 the premises even though the 
accident occurred on the premises. Other courts have held that the 
phrase "in connection with" used with the word "premises" means at 
the very least "on the pre:mises. 11 See, 29 A. L. R. 3d 847 wherein the 
cases of Dueder Watch Co. v. Young, 155 Ill. 226 and Gurney v. Atlantic 
~. 58 N. Y. 358 are cited as authority. In spite of that authority, the 
First Circuit Court held that the exclusion did not apply because even 
though the accident occurred on the premises it was not caused by the 
condition, operation or neglect of the premises. 
In our case the accident did not even occur on the premises. 
J'''ninQ, as respondent contends, that the phrase "arising out of" and 
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the phrase "in connection with" are synonymous and that either phrase 
used with the word "premises 11 means at least "on the premises," then, 
the condition precedent failing, the exclusionary clause in respondent's 
homeowner's insurance policy would not apply, the accident having 
occurred on a public highway adjacent to the "premises" in question, 
Appellant's construction of the policy is bolstered by the 
fact that respondent neglected to include in its policy language commonly 
found in similar homeowner's policies extending the exclusion to include 
"sidewalks, ways or property i=ediately adjacent thereto." However, 
several courts, even with the language extending the exclusion to 
adjoining or adjacent property, have still required that the incident 
occur on the premises described and defined in the policy. 
In General Accident Fire & Life Ins. Corp. v. Woeffel, 7 
Misc. 2d 952, 161 N. Y. S. 2d 794 (1967) the Court rendered a judgment 
for the insurer on the ground that the accident did not happen at a point 
included within the area covered by the policy. It was the insurer's 
action for a declaratory judgment determining the question of its duty 
to defend the insured under a policy covering liability because of injuries 
sustained by a person caused by accident, arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of the designated premises, including buildings 
and structures thereon and the ways i=ediately adjoining, with respect 
to injuries sustained in a collision by a third person who was in an auto-
mobile standing parked at the curb in front of a poultry market whici, 
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was next door to the insured's service station, it appearing that the 
rear of the automobile was between 20 to 25 feet north of the northerly 
boundary line of the service station when it was hit by an automobile 
which was driven out of the service station by an employee of the insured. 
The court reasoned that the phrase "ways immediately adjoining" must 
be defined to include "that area and only that area contained within the 
geometrical figure formed by the intersections of the building line of 
any premises in question, the extension (from each end of that building 
line) of the lot lines of such premises and either the curved or the 
building line across the street from the premises in question. 11 
[Emphasis added. J In our case the geometrical area in question would 
be even mo re restricted, the policy exclusion not extending itself to 
adjoining or adjacent premises. 
In Long v. Lundon &: L. Indem. Co., 119 F. 2d 628 (Ohio, 
1941) where a motorcycle police officer was thrown off his cycle onto the 
pavement and was injured at a point approximately 60 feet east of the 
nearest portion of the insured' s property immediately adjacent to the 
street on which the accident occurred, as the result of a collision between 
a dog \vhich ran out of the insured' s driveway and the motorcycle, the 
court held that the place where the accident and resulting injury 
occurred determined liability under the policy and that the locus in quo 
cir t 11c· c•.1ccident was not on a way immediately adjacent to the premises 
'"s 1.ired, and, therefore, there was no policy coverage. 
-11-
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Exclusion 1 (e) of respondent's homeov.rner' s policy does 
not apply because construing the clause narrowly, against the insurer 
and in favor of the insured. the phrase "arising out of any premises" 
requires that the accident occur on the property and be caused by a 
condition, operation or neglect of the same, and, in our case, the 
accident occurred off the premises on a public highway. 
POINT III 
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT IS NOT WHETHER 
THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE OF A NON-DRIVER 
OWNER OR THAT OF A NON-OWNER DRIVER IS PRIMARY 
Respondents reliance upon the cases of National Farmers 
Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah Zd 
89, 377 P. Zd 786 (1963) and Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
21 Utah Zd 194, 443 P. Zd 385 (1968) is perplexing. The cases are 
inapposite to the issues at hand. Admittedly, it is the law in Utah that 
the automobile insurance of a non-driver owner is primary and that of 
the non-owner driver secondary. In fact, the standard automobile 
liability insurance policy will state in its "other insurance" clause 
something to the effect that the particular insurance with respect to a 
non-owned automobile shall be excess over any other collectible 
insurance. This case does not involve a non-owner driver, non-driver 
owner, nor conflicting automobile liability insurance policies. We are 
dealing with a homeowner's insurance policy, concurrent coverage, 
different "other insurance" clauses and the problern of apportionni·c"' 
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Accordingly, those auto1nobile liability cases are not particularly 
helpful in resolving this dispute. 
Our question is one of overlapping primary coverage. Con-
cededly, appellant's general liability insurance policy expressly provides 
primary insurance. It is our position that respondent's homeowner' s 
policy similarly provides primary protection. We concur with the 
Colorado Supreme Court in the case of State Automobile and Casualty 
Underwriters v. Beeson, Colo., 516 P. 2d 623, 626 (1973) where it said: 
••• as here, an insured is engaged in an 
activity covered by one policy while at the 
same time engaged in acts covered by another, 
the coincidental overlapping cannot defeat the 
coverage of either or both of the policies where 
they would otherwise both cover the accident. 
That case involved duplicate coverage under two homeowner 1s insurance 
policies, 
In short, the cases of National Farmers Union Property and 
Casualty Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, supra_, and Christensen v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, are not legitimate authority for the 
proposition that appellant's coverage is primary and that of respondent 
secondary. Equity and justice require that where there is concurrent 
primary coverage and both policies contain pro rata "other insurance" 
pi·ovisions that the insurers pro rate the loss • 
. . . . 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and appellant's original Brief, 
the denouement seems to be that: 
1. Brent G, Story was covered by respondent's 
homeowner' s insurance policy; 
2. Exclusion 1 (e) of respondent's homeowner's 
insurance policy does not exclude coverage of this loss; and 
3. Respondent and appellant having provided concurrer· 
overlapping and duplicate coverage of the same loss on the same prirnar: 
basis, they should pro rate the loss consonant with the proportionate 
amount each insured bears to the whole insurance covering the loss, 
Therefore, appellant seeks to have the Order granting 
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying appellant's Mot" 
for Summary Judgment and further seeks a judgment in its fa;ror and 
against the respondent. --y-
/ r7 Dated this~-·-- day of January, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIP,P AN~ CHRISTIAN }f, / d( I-
I\ / I I- ( L,{ l _,<..<-1 ,:../~,, 
, D~ c'ARY ctHHISTIAN 
( 
. . I 
I; ~ (; 
~PD1*~J,, 
J~R Bf,Al<E',[,r,c 
__ / . 
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